Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-Line Injury Cases under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Is Fowler v. Gorlick Dead by Rez, Donald G.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 5 Article 2
6-1-1980
Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-
Line Injury Cases under Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act: Is Fowler v. Gorlick Dead
Donald G. Rez
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald G. Rez, Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-Line Injury Cases under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Is
Fowler v. Gorlick Dead, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 660 (1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol55/iss5/2
Causation and Automatic Damages in Secondary-Line
Injury Cases Under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act: Is Fowler v. Gorlick Dead?
Donald G. Rez*
I. Introduction
In a 1969 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held in Fowler Manufacturing Company v. Gorlick that a private party seeking
damages for secondary-line injuries suffered from price discrimination viola-
tions of the Robinson-Patman Act 2 need not establish a causal relationship be-
tween the price discrimination alleged and the amount of damages demanded.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[Tihe right of a court to grant a general damage award under the Robinson-
Patman Act for the amount of an illegal difference in prices and allowances
does not depend upon its having been evidentially established, and the court's
being able to find on the basis thereof, that a lessening of competition has in
fact occurred, and that the extent of the injury occasioned thereby in the par-
ticular situation corresponds to the amount of the discrimination. The Act
permits recovery of the amount of a discrimination in prices and allowances
without the necessity of any such specific proof or finding as a basis therefor.
3
The decision substantially relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving two
separate elements of a price discrimination claim. This holding contravenes
every known principle of the antitrust laws. Under Fowler, the plaintiff need
not prove a causal relationship between the price discrimination and the
asserted injury. Thus, the plaintiff is freed from proving any injury to competi-
tion. Secondly, the plaintiff is presumptively entitled to automatic damages-a
* Associate, Sullivan, Jones & Archer, San Diego, California. Member of the California Bar. B.A.,
Texas, 1975; J.D., Harvard, 1978.
1 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Fowler).
2 Section 2(a) ofthe Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976)
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination....
Originally, section 2 of the Clayton Act was concerned with price discrimination's effect upon the seller's
competitors (primary-line injury). However, the advent of mass-purchasing chain stores and various forms
of discount houses, following World War I, seemingly threatened the survival of independent merchants.
These merchants prevailed upon the Congress to amend the statute to more effectively control
discriminatory concessions the chains received from suppliers. Thus, the main thrust of the Robinson-
Patman amendments is control of secondary-line injury. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 866-67 (1974).
3 415 F.2d at 1253. This language immediately makes Fowler assailable. "By the express wording of
the statute, the effect on competition must be substantial. Trivial, remote, or inconsequential effect is not
enough. 'There must be something more than an essentially temporary minimal impact on competition.' "
Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122, 150 (10th Cir. 1965). Thus, as to some alleged in-
juries the statutory language itself rebuts Fowler.
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damage award of the full amount of the difference in price paid by it and that
paid by its competitor. Thus, the plaintiff would not be required to
demonstrate the actual amount of damages that it has suffered. Conceivably,
an uninjured plaintiff could recover substantial damages under the Fowler stan-
dard.
Fowler has recently become the focus of contention in several Robinson-
Patman Act cases in the Ninth Circuit. In Ricky Hasbrouck, db/a Rick's Texaco v.
Texaco,4 a Spokane, Washington, jury returned a substantial treble damage
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. 5 The suit was filed by twelve Texaco dealers
alleging that Texaco sold gasoline at a lower price to certain favored
distributors. Two Fowler jury instructions, on the crucial causation and
damages elements in the case, were proposed by the plaintiff and given by the
court.
6
Judge Marion Callister, on March 31, 1980, entered an order granting a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Texaco. The court also issued
a memorandum decision which held that its jury instructions predicated on
Fowler were erroneous and should not have been given. The court further
declared that Fowler is not the law in the Ninth Circuit. Given that a large jury
verdict is at stake, the Ninth Circuit will soon be offered an opportunity to
review its Fowler decision.
On the basis of the Hasbrouck jury verdict, seven Shell dealers in Arizona
have filed a $2.3 million suit against Shell alleging that Shell sold gasoline to
certain "wholesale mass marketers" at five cents per gallon less than it charged
the dealers. Similarly, eight Union 76 dealers in Arizona have filed a suit
claiming $1.25 million. They also claim that certain distributors were receiving
unwarranted preferential prices.
7
Two other recent decisions have flatly rejected the Fowler analysis. The
Fifth Circuit, in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 8 acknowleged Fowler
4 No. C-76-27 (E.D. Wash).
5 The jury returned a verdict of approximately $2.75 million after trebling on August 31, 1979.
6 The two injury instructions relied heavily on Fowler. The first instruction, on causation, cited only
Fowler. It read as follows:
With respect to this requirement of proving that the violation was a proximate cause of injury to
the plaintiff, I instruct you that under the Robinson-Patman Act this requirement is satisfied if
you find that Texaco did unlawfully discriminate in price against the plaintiff. The discrimina-
tion in price or services is regarded under the law as constituting a direct business injury.
Therefore, if you find that Texaco did unlawfully discriminate in price or services against a plain-
tiff, without legal justification, then you should also find that the plaintiff suffered injury which
was proximately caused by the violation.
The second instruction also prominently featured Fowler and read as follows:
In this case, the plaintiffs have measured the damages which they allege they suffered as being
equal to the amount of the price discrimination. I instruct you that this is one appropriate way in
which damages may be measured in a case like this. As I just mentioned, the amount of a
discrimination in price is regarded as constituting a direct business injury. Under the law, the ac-
tual amount of discrimination can thus be the measure of a general damage award for a plaintiff.
That is, you may measure the damages by taking the per gallon discrimination and multiplying it
by the number of gallons the plaintiff purchased. This does not preclude you from measuring
such damages, if any, in any other reasonable manner or from assessing any additional or other
damages you may find to have been proximately caused by defendant's actions. You may make a
reasonable estimate based upon actual facts which are in evidence. As I have said before, the
decision on whether there have been violations of the law, and if so, what the damages are, are
entirely within the province of the jury.
7 Oil Express, November 26, 1979, at 1; Oil Express, March 3, 1980, at 1.
8 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).
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but stated that "we decline to follow it. "9 A federal district court decision. Ed-
wardf- Sweeney &Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. was even more emphatic.' 0 The court
in that case directed a verdict for the defendant. It did so despite the plaintiff's
reliance upon Fowler. "After reviewing Fowler and cases decided before and
after it, I find that it does not represent the law of this circuit and probably
would not represent the law of the Ninth Circuit today.""
It is clear that the issue of the continuing validity and effect of the Fowler
decision has been joined. It is the conclusion of this article that Judge Cahn's




Fowler establishes that a court may award damages solely upon the proof of
price discrimination, without proof of a connection between the discrimination
and the injury allegedly suffered by the plaintiff. By dispensing with the re-
quirement of proof of causation of injury, Fowler departs from the established
elements for private recovery under the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court has expressly disaffirmed the Fowler causation con-
cept espoused in Fowler. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 13 a case brought by a
distributor against his supplier, the Court explicitly held that the plaintiff must
establish that its injury was the result of the illegal price discrimination in order
to recover damages.' 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Perkins noted that it was
the plaintiff's burden to establish such causation. 15 The Fowler holding that an
award of damages under the Robinson-Patman Act "does not depend upon its
having been evidentially established ... that a lessening of competition has in
fact occurred, and that the extent of the injury occasioned thereby in the par-
ticular situation corresponds to the amount of the discrimination ' ' 16 does not
comport with the Supreme Court's mandate.
Furthermore, the Fowler court neglected to consider that section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act does not, by its own terms, establish a private right of
action but merely establishes the standard of illegality. It is section 4 of the
9 Id. at 1136.
10 478 F.Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
11 Id. at 273.
12 The opinion in Fowler was written by Judge Johnsen, an Eighth Circuit judge sitting by designation
on this case. It is interesting to note thatJudgeJohnsen had authored an earlier Robinson-Patman Act opin-
ion on causation and damages for the Eighth Circuit in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150
F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). Subsequently, in American Can Co. v. Russellville
Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951), that court limited much of the applicability of its Elizabeth Arden
holding. JudgeJohnsen dissented. He did so on the basis of his decision in Elizabeth Arden and some dicta in
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). These are the precise bases upon which he
rested his opinion in Fowler. Thus, the Eighth Circuit had already cast suspicion upon Judge Johnsen's
Robinson-Patman analysis prior to his authoring Fowler. See Enterprises Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240
F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (Judge Learned Hand, after analyzing Elizabeth Arden
and Bruce's Juices rejected them as providing improper standards of Robinson-Patman damages).
13 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
14 Id. at 648. ("Before an injured party can recover damages under the Act, he must, of course, be able
to show a causal connection between the price discrimination in violation of the Act and the injury suffered.")
(Emphasis added).
15 Id. at 648-49. (Plaintiff"had the burden of showing that any damage to his business was proximately
caused by [defendant's] price discriminations.
16 Fowler, 415 F.2d at 1253.
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Clayton Act which permits a private right of action. 17 The Fowler court wholly
ignored section 4 of the Clayton Act. Rather, the court predicated it analysis on
section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. In terms of the elements of causation
and damages, this was clearly erroneous.
Initially, the statutory history of the Robinson-Patman Act is quite ex-
plicit in rejecting the very causal inference adopted in Fowler. The Senate had
adopted a special private right of action section applicable to the Robinson-
Patman Act which incorporated a Fowler-like provision. However, that provi-
sion was deleted in conference.18 This strongly suggests that the standards of
section 4 of the Clayton Act were contemplated by Congress to be applicable to
the Robinson-Patman Act.
There is little doubt that section 4 of the Clayton Act requires that a plain-
tiff prove a causal relation between the antitrust violation asserted and the in-
jury alleged. The Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc.19 resolved the issue when it required the plaintiffs in a private treble
damage action to "prove antitrust injury. "20 The Ninth Circuit in particular
has been most emphatic in applying this analysis to its antitrust cases. In Sol-
inger v. A & M Records, 21 the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff must establish
that the loss sustained by its business or property "was caused by the alleged
antitrust violation" in order properly to maintain a private antitrust action for
damages. 2 2 In Kapp v. National Football League,23 the Ninth Circuit agreed that
the trial "court properly instructed the jury that there must be a causal rela-
tionship between the illegality, if any, and the injury if proved. ' ' 24 The mere
fact that an antitrust violation had been demonstrated was insufficient. The
plaintiff was required to prove that there was a causal connection between the
asserted antitrust injury and the violation of the antitrust laws.
This is precisely the holding in California Computer Products, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp. 25 In that case the court stated that only those per-
sons causally injured by antitrust violations could maintain a private action.
"Moreover, in order to prevail the plaintiff must prove'not only injury causally
17 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (1976), provides as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 The conference report states that "The Senate bill set up a new measure of damages for violations of
the law, whereas the House bill left the damages to be determined in accordance with the provision of the ex-
isting Clayton Act. The Senate receded." Conference Report, HR No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
quoted in Measure and Elements of Damages for Violation of Robinson-Patman Act, 9 ALR FED. 279, 282.
19 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
20 Id. at 489 ("Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should
reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the viola-
tion"). (Emphasis in original).
21 586 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
22 Id. at 1310 ("The third element that [plaintiff] must show in order to sustain a claim under section 4
is that the loss to his business or property was caused by the alleged antitrust violation. The injury caused by
the violation must be one the antitrust laws were designed to protect against").
23 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
24 Id. at 648.
25 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979).
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linked to the asserted violation, but also that the injury is of the type the an-
titrust laws were intended to prevent."
26
The Supreme Court's decision in Perkins27 leaves little doubt that the re-
quirement of a causal connection is specifically applicable to Robinson-Patman
cases. Legally and conceptually, the Robinson-Patman Act is an antitrust
statute. It must be construed in accordance with general principles of antitrust
law. 28 Moreover, in light of the Brunswick line of cases, it seems clear that
private suits for violation of the Robinson-Patman Act must, like other private
antitrust actions, be construed to require a showing of causation.
Indeed, Brunswick and its progeny have been explicitly applied to cases in-
volving claims under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Fifth Cir-
cuit was explicit in the use of this methodology. In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J.
Truett Payne, Inc., 29 the court first cited Brunswick and restated its holding. The
court then noted different prices charged different purchasers did not necessari-
ly cause antitrust injury. The plaintiff, the court held, must still establish that
the price differential actually caused him to lose sales or profits to the favored
purchaser.3 0 Similarly, the court in the Sweeney case quoted Brunswick and
refused to apply Fowler on the basis of the analysis mandated by Brunswick.
3 1
The Seventh Circuit, in Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 32 affirmed the
granting of a summary judgment to defendant on a section 2(a) claim. In so do-
ing, that court also relied heavily on the Brunswick analysis.
The essential error in the Fowler analysis is that it relies exclusively on a
showing of a price differential. Yet such reliance fails to recognize that "price
discrimination is ... only one element of the statutory prohibition and [is] not
26 Id. at 77,972. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 468 F.Supp. 226, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (for plain-
tiffs to prove the fact of damage they "must establish with reasonable probability the existence of a causal
connection between defendant's violation of the antitrust law and plaintiff's revenue-impairing injury");
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 688 (1980)
("plaintiff must show more than that it suffered injury causally linked to the antitrust violation; the injury
must be shown to have 'flowed' from the wrong.")
27 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
28 See Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. FTC, 99 S.Ct. 925, 933 n.13 (1979) ("More than
once the Court has stated that the Robinson-Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader
policies of the antitrust laws. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., - U.S. -., 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57
L.Ed.2d 854; Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. at 74. See also LaRue, RecentJudicial Efforts to Recon-
cile the Robinson-Patman Act with the Sherman Act, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 325 (1979).
29 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).
30 Specifically the court held as follows:
As the Supreme Court ruled in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97
S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), the antitrust laws do not provide a damages remedy for all
losses traceable to conduct violating the antitrust laws, only for losses that are part of the an-
ticompetitive effect of such conduct. When a seller charges different prices to different pur-
chasers, as alleged here, injury to competition does not necessarily result. Both the statute and
the courts recognize this. 15 U.S.C. S 13(a). See, e.g., UnitedStates v. United States Gypsum Co.,438
U.S. 422, 450, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). Competition is harmed only to the extent
that the favored purchaser, by use of the discriminatory price difference, actually draws sales or
profits from his unfavored competitor. See, e.g., Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965, 77 S.Ct. 1049, 1 L.Ed.2d 914 (1957); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco
Auto Service, Inc., 461 F.Supp. 350, 357-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351
F.Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th
Cir. 1973); Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 979, 992-93 (1977). See
also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-49, 89 S.Ct. 1871, 23 L.Ed.2d 599 (1969) (im-
plying that disfavored purchaser must show more than mere price difference to recover
damages). As discussed above, there is no evidence, much less substantial evidence, that such
was the case here.
Id. at 1136.
31 EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, 478 F.Supp. 243, 273-75 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
32 586 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
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per se illegal or unfair. ,,33 Fowler ignores the remaining elements of a cause of
action brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 34 Indeed, as stated by the
court in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc.:
[T]he showing necessary to establish a section 2(a) violation is not the same as
the showing necessary to support a private action for damages. . . . Price
discrimination which threatens competition but which has not caused any ac-
tual competitive injury may be held to violate the statute even though it will
not support an action for damages.
3 5
Thus, the assertion in Fowler that the "case law as to the Sherman Act does not
fit the Robinson-Patman Act ' 36 is irrelevant. At issue is the construction of
section 4 of the Clayton Act which has been interpreted to require plaintiffs to
prove causation of injury before damages will be awarded for a violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act.
7
The overwhelming response of courts which have faced a treble damage
price discrimination claim has been to require a particularized showing of
causal connection between the price discrimination and the injury asserted.
Fowler not withstanding, courts have simply never recognized a presumption
which spans this causal requirement.
For example, in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 38 a pre-Fowler case,
the Ninth Circuit rejected any presumption connecting a price differential with
an injury. "There is no presumption set up anywhere that, merely because
there is a differential in various areas, necessarily a price discrimination
33 Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 220 F.Supp. 784, 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) citing Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 64, 79 S.Ct. 1005 (1959).
The "Supreme Court [363 U.S. 536] at 553, 80 S.Ct. at 1277, disclaimed any flat prohibition of price dif-
ferentials, recognizing that price differences constitute but one element of a § 2(a) violation." Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.2d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1961), on remandfrom, 363 U.S. 536,
80 S.Ct. 1267 (1960), quoted in, Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1961). See Rutledge v.
Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 677 (9th Cir. 1975).
34 "Since commercial hardship may arise from an infinite range of factors, a fundamental prerequisite
of any treble-damage recovery is that the plaintiff's injury is the causal consequence of the defendant's prov-
en violation. For in the absence of such a causal nexus, the plaintiff's damages are not produced 'by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,' as required by the authorization of section 4 of the Clayton
Act." F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, 530 (1962).
35 607 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1979). Indeed, it may be that some showing of causation is required
even in government enforcement cases where section 4 is inapplicable. For example in Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952),
the court deemed "the absence of causal connection" decisive. But see Foremost Dairies v. FTC, 348 F.2d
674, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) ("FTC's inference of probable competitive injury has
been upheld even in the face of direct testimony by non-favored customers that the price discrimination had
not resulted in an injury to their businesses.").
36 415 F.2d at 1251. See Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 756 (1947).
37 It is true that in Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 908 (1979), the Ninth Circuit properly noted that the strength of the showing of causation which must
be shown varies under the different antitrust statutes. However, this variable standard requires a more
stringent showing of causation for those statutes involving an incipiency standard such as section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 586 F.2d at 1312 n.9. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). This
is because violations of these statutes imply absolutely nothing more than that competition may be harmed.
In such cases, damages are more threatened than real. Similarly, the "Robinson-Patman Act is an incipien-
cy statute." Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 1979). Thus, the
required showing of causation should be more stringent in a Robinson-Patman case than in a Sherman Act
case. Thus, in a perverse way, Fowler was not incorrect, it was only backwards. See Areeda, Antitrust Viola-
tions Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1976).
38 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
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exists." ' 39 The mere proof of a differential, without causation and damages,
does not constitute actionable price discrimination.
40
In Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 4 1 the district court held that the
fact that manufacturers of hydraulic hoses had sold their products to manufac-
turers of coupling assemblies at prices ranging from eighteen to twenty-five
percent less than prices at which they sold to the plaintiffs was insufficient by
itself to establish a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. 42 Significantly,
although the case was decided after Fowler, this ruling was explicitly upheld by
the Ninth Circuit. 43 Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Ninth Circuit
cited and relied upon Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co. 44 The court in that case had
required explicit showings by the plaintiff of causation and damages. Fowler
had questioned the validity of that ruling. The fact that the Ninth Circuit
thereafter relied upon this case, while ignoring Fowler, tends to draw Fowler into
serious question.
Numerous other cases suggest the limited vitality of Fowler. In Dantzler v.
Dictograph Products, Inc., 45 the court was explicit in requiring a showing of a
"causal connection." Indeed the court noted that such a requirement was
mandated by the case law on the subject. 46 Similarly, in Kidd v. Esso Standard
Oil Co., 47 defendant prevailed despite ajury finding of price discrimination and
competition. As stated in Alexander v. Texas Co., 48 even assuming an unlawful
price discrimination, a plaintiff must nevertheless establish that the price dif-
ference resulted in the diversion of business to the preferred customers.4 9 The
court in Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 50 was even more emphatic.
"There is no presumption that the proscribed discrimination in price has
caused damage to the plaintiff. The burden of proving such damage is always
on the plaintiff."51
Furthermore, it is clear that this burden is not satisfied by a mere recita-
tion of the fact of price discrimination. All of the cited cases involved such
recitations but nevertheless deemed the showing of causation to have been in-
adequate. The case of McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc. 52 is especially instructive. In that
case, the court noted that the plaintiff had not established an evidentiary basis
39 Id. at 368.
40 See Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. J. R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1969) (price
discrimination only prohibited "where the 'effect' causes or may cause forbidden competitive injury."); See
also Refrigeration Engineering Corp. v. Frick Company, 370 F.Supp. 702, 713 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
41 327 F.Supp. 1267 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
42 Id. at 1275.
43 Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 677 (9th Cir. 1975).
44 166 F.Supp. 146, 147 (D. Ore. 1958).
45 309 F.2d (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963).
46 Id. at 330 ("The need for one who claims damage in a suit of this kind to show the causal connectioi
between the losses he suffers and the illegal acts of the defendant, is clearly shown in the cases cited and
other decisions of the courts").
47 295 F.2d 497, 498 (6th Cir. 1961).
48 165 F.Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958).
49 Id. at 58. ("Assuming that defendant committed unlawful price discrimination, plaintiff must still
show that Texaco's price differences were the proximate cause of a diversion of business from him to the 12
preferred Texaco dealers"). (Emphasis in original).
50 187 F.Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
51 Id. at 353. See Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964)
("The plaintiff must further prove a causal connection between the price discrimination and the alleged in-
juries as well as the damages suffered .. ").




to satisfy this proximate causation requirement. The court quoted the "causal
connection" language of Perkins and then noted that "[a]s the courts have long
explained, this is obviously not satisfied by merely showing a price difference,
particularly in the gasoline marketing context where the favored and disfavored
purchasers are not the only ones in the marketplace to whom the ultimate con-
sumer may turn." 53 The court further reasoned that reliance by the plaintiff on
price difference alone is insufficient. Such reliance would fail to "satisfy the
fundamental evidentiary requirements that would allow a jury to infer the req-
uisite causal connection between the lower price to someone else and injury to
plaintiffs' business or property."
5 4
Although a few decisions have supported the Fowler causation analysis,
55
recent case authority is strongly contrary to that position. As discussed above,
the courts in both Chysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc.5 6 and EdwardJ.
Sweeney &Sons, Inc. v. Texaco57 explicitly rejected Fowler. A Fowler-type analysis
was also dismissed in Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.5 8 That court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant solely on the grounds that the plaintiffs
"had not shown sufficient injury to sustain a private action under the Clayton
Act."59 The plaintiff-dealers claimed violations of sections 2(a), (d), and (e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act for programs which Chrysler had instituted to in-
crease sales to "fleet purchasers." The plaintiff-dealers had not participated in
these programs. Although the plaintiffs presented an expert witness, summary
judgment was entered. The court rejected a theory of damages predicated upon
"the 'inherent' economic effects" of the defendants' actions. The court held
that "a plaintiff must pr6ve that he has been or will be injured by some viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. '60 This refusal to apply an inherent effects test seems
in direct contravention of Fowler. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit implicitly re-
jected a Fowler analysis in Marty's Floor Covering Co. v. GAF Corp.61 The court
noted that the trial court had emphasized that "there was no sufficient proof of
causation affecting competition on plaintiffs part" despite a showing of price
53 Id. at 1341.
54 Id.
55 For example, in Becker-Lehmann, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 202 F.Supp. 514, 517
(E.D. Mo. 1959), the court, relying on the same Bruce's Juices dictum, see 330 U.S. 743, (1947), as did the
Fowler court, stated that:
Firestone has chosen to support its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that even if
they have discriminated against the plaintiff, it cannot recover because it cannot show that it has
suffered any damages as a proximate result of the conduct of any one defendant. Proof that
Firestone illegally discriminated in price in favor of The Suburban Tire Company would be suffi-
cient in itself to show some damage to the plaintiff.
See Mississippi Petroleum, Inc. v. Vermont Gas Systems, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,843 (S.D.
Miss. 1972) (Court noted that Fowler allowed presumption of competitive injury but noted cases contra.
Nevertheless, the court seemed to apply Fowler.) The court in Power Replacement Corp. v. Air Preheater
Co., Inc., 356 F.Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1973) did not go as far. However, that court did say that the showing
of discriminatory prices shifted the burden to defendant to establish that damages were not proximately
caused by the discrimination. 356 F.Supp. at 899. The Supreme Court decision in Perkies seems directly at
odds with this district court opinion.
56 607 F.2d 1133 (1979).
57 478 F.Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
58 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59 Id. at 668.
60 Id. at 670.
61 604 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 670 (1980).
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fluctuations between prices charged plaintiff and other purchasers. 62 The court
of appeals agreed.
63
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Zwicker v. J.I. Case Co. 64 is perhaps most
impressive of all because the Fowler opinion is predicated essentially on the
1945 Eighth Circuit opinion in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. 65 The
approach outlined in Elizabeth Arden was not used in Zwicker, which clearly re-
quired a showing of actual causation. 66 In that case, the manufacturer had in-
stituted a special program whereby certain dealers could qualify for discounts
and other benefits. The plaintiff-dealer was initially not included in the pro-
gram. Other nearby dealers were included. The plaintiff's sales dropped, 67 and
plaintiff eventually sued. Despite the fact that plaintiff's sales had declined and
that nearby dealers were receiving benefits for sales they were making, the trial
court granted damages only for injuries resulting from one sale. 68 The court of
appeals rejected even this award in language requiring a particularized show-
ing of causation:
We need not decide whether that [loss of a single sale] would satisfy the re-
quirement of injury to competition, for our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the court clearly erred in finding that Zwicker's lost tractor sale
was the result of the price discrimination.
69
The trend in recent case law overwhelmingly requires a particularized showing
of causation.
70
III. Causation and Damages
Fowler also impacts on a second element of a price discrimination case.
Much of the Fowler opinion focuses upon the amount of damages to which a
plaintiff is entitled and the method of computation by which this amount is
ascertained. Initially, it should be noted that the issues of causation and
amount of damages overlap significantly. In the first place, damages cannot be
established as antitrust injury unless the proper causative nexus exists. Fur-
62 Id at 270.
63 Id. ("We agree.").
64 596 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1979).
65 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
66 And damages as well.
67 "During the period of Zwicker's exclusion from Operation Penetration, two Case dealers with a
thirty-mile radius of Turtle Lake received various benefits as a result of the program. In 1971, of thirty-three
sales made by the Case dealer in McClusky, North Dakota, ten were accorded Operation Penetration dis-
counts. Similarly, seven out of the sixteen sales made in 1971 by the Case dealer in Garrison, North Dakota,
were Operation Penetration sales. Meanwhile, Zwicker's sales of large Case tractors dropped from eight in
1968-69, and ten in a fourteen-month period in 1969-70, to three sales during all of 1971." 596 F.2d at 307.
68 "The trial court found that the sole injury resulting from the price discrimination was the single trac-
tor sale Zwicker lost to the McClusky dealer." Id. at 309.
69 Id.
70 See Palmer News, Inc. v. ARA Services, Inc., 476 F.Supp. 1176, 1190 (D. Kan. 1979) ("[A]ny
Robinson-Patman plaintiff must undertake to prove a causal connection between the price differential com-
plained of and the injury suffered." See also General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass & Trim Co., 1978-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,998 at 74,271 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (requiring particularized showing of causation under sec-
tion 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F.Supp. 404, 427-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,'48 U.S.L.W. 3517,




thermore, the harm must arise from the antitrust violation. "To be one of
several causes is not enough." ' 71 The damages awarded in an antitrust case
must represent compensation for an injury to an interest protected by the an-
titrust laws. To the extent that other factors contribute to the plaintiff's injury,
the causation element is lacking and damages should not be awarded.
72
The plaintiff must show a causal connection between the violation and its
reduced sales, because there may be other reasons for the reduction in sales.
For example, one of the factors which may break this causative link is that of
off-setting costs incurred by the favored purchaser which neutralize any
nominal price advantage a price discrimination may afford.
73
Fowler presumes the entire total of the price discrimination to be the actual
damages suffered by plaintiff. However, in cases in which the favored pur-
chaser performs functions in excess of those performed by the plaintiff, the
Fowler standard is unrelated to the actual damages suffered. Wholesalers who
also sell at retail still incur costs by performing wholesaling functions which
most retailers do not perform. They also may save the manufacturer the ex-
pense of providing certain services. In such cases, Fowler is particularly inap-
propriate either as establishing a presumption for causation or for the measure
of damages.
Similarly, there are cases in which a plaintiff has admitted that it was
forced to lower prices because of the competition of third-party retailers, not
that of the favored purchaser. This admission denies a causal relation between
defendant's alleged discriminatory sales and the plaintiffs claimed injuries.
Such a situation was presented to the court in Krieger v. Texaco,, Inc. 74 on
Texaco's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs had testified that sta-
tions other than those of the favored purchaser were underselling them. As the
court stated: "There is no claim that the lost gallonage went to the Glaser sta-
tions. In fact, he mentions three stations closer to him than any Glaser station
which charged lower prices than himself.' ' 75 As a result, summary judgment
was appropriately entered. The plaintiff must not only show causation, but
also establish a particularized correlation between the price discrimination and
the resultant damages.
7 6
71 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 688
(1980).
72 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
73 "For so long as the amount of the discount corresponds with the cost of the functions assumed by the
recipient, it is absorbed by the buyer and cannot causally influence competition based on his resale ac-
tivities, which are shaped by a multitude of commercial considerations." F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 192 (1962).
In this regard a difficulty with the Fowler causation presumption is that it suggests that a private plain-
tiff may thereafer take advantage of the "price by use" doctrine established in FTC cases. That doctrine
holds that a wholesaler who sells a portion of his goods at retail may not receive a wholesaler's discount for
the goods sold at retail regardless of whether wholesale functions were performed. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co.
v. F.T.C., 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Monroe Auto
Equipment Co. v. F.T.C., 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965). If Fowler's causation presumption is applied to the
"price by use" concept, it is clear that an integrated retailer will be subjected to treble damage suits merely
because it has internalized certain necessary wholesaling functions rather than purchasing them from the
outside. Applying Fowler in such a context would promote inefficiency, result in higher consumer prices, and
discourage the evolution of new forms of merchandising.
74 373 F.Supp. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
75 Id. at 113.
76 See Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965,
(1957); McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 1332 (S.D. Ala. 1972). Compare the recent dicta in Paceco,
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IV. Damages
Once the fact of antitrust injury and the requisite causation have been
established, plaintiffs burden becomes much less severe. The Supreme Court
has recognized that there is "a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and
the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix that amount."7 This is
a distinction "between the existence of an injury in fact and the means by
which the amount of damage can be measured .... [The] inability to estimate
... damages does not mean that they were not suffered; nor does it bar an an-
titrust suit." ' 78 It should be noted that there is some debate concerning the
amount of overlap between proof of causation and amount of damages. 79 In ef-
fect, these somewhat conflicting standards tend to give some leeway to the jury.
"If there is sufficient evidence in the record to support an inference of causa-
tion, the ultimate conclusion as to what that evidence proves is for the jury.' '80
Merely because some leeway is granted to the plaintiff regarding the re-
quired amount of proof, it should not follow that a presumption as to the
amount of damages to be awarded exists. Nevertheless, it is within the context
of establishing the amount of money plaintiff may recover that Fowler reasserts
itself. The Ninth Circuit stated as follows:
[W]e hold that under the Robinson-Patman Act, unless the evidence
establishes a greater consequential injury, discrimination in prices or
allowances is entitled to be regarded as constituting a direct business injury
and that the amount thereof thus properly can be made the basis and measure
of a general damage award.8'
By itself, this holding can be reasonable. Certainly there are times when the
amount of the discrimination is also the amount of the actual injury suffered by
a plaintiff. However, the Fowler court went even further: "The Act permits
recovery of the amount of a discrimination in prices and allowances without the
necessity of any specific proof or finding as a basis therefor. "82 Such a rule,
Inc. v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy, Etc., 468 F.Supp. 256, 263 (N.D. Cal. 1979) in which the court noted
in passing that "In dealing with a standardized product such as gasoline where a retailer acquires it for im-
mediate resale, the price of that commodity plays the determinative role in competition." The court therein
had no occasion to pass on these additional concepts and the statement seems to have been a mere throw-
away line.
77 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1930).
For example:
"At least two types of evidence have been used to show a causal connection between the price discrimination
and the reduced sales: (1) customer testimony that they bought from the plaintiff before the discrimination
period but thereafter bought from a favored buyer because the favored buyer's price was less than the plain-
tiff's; and (2) corresponding loss of sale volume during the discrimination period by other nonfavored
buyers." Measure and Elements of Damages for Violation of Robinson-Patman Act, 9 A.L.R. FED. 279, 288.
78 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1979).
79 For example, the Handgards language stating that "[t]o be one of several causes is not enough" 601
F.2d at 997 should be contrasted with the statement that "[p]laintiff need not show that the illegality was a
more substantial cause than any other." Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 466 F.2d
1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1972), quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 302 U.S. 134,
143, 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1987 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
80 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
81 415 F.2d at 1252.
82 Id. at 1253.
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establishing a presumption of damages in the amount of the price discrimina-
tion, is contrary to the established law and has been widely criticized.
The Fowler rule has, however, received some support based primarily on
its simplicity and ease of application. Such ease of administration should be
weighed against the observation that the "inability to prove damages to the
satisfaction of the judiciary ... is the most important of the many reasons that
can be specified to explain the failure of private enforcement as an instrument
of antitrust policy.' '83 The Fowler presumption, on the other hand, certainly
facilitates private damage recovery. Perhaps for this reason, the Fowler analysis
has attracted a following, however limited.
8 4
In the main, the Fowler presumption of damage has been either criticized
or ignored. Regarded as a deviation of the case law when decided, it has had
little influence on subsequent developments. One reason for its lack of in-
fluence is that the Fowler language is only dictum. It bears no relation to the
damages actually granted in the case. Fowler was a manufacturer of electric
water heaters. Gorlick was a wholesaler of plumbing supplies and used its elec-
tric water heaters, along with his competitors, as a "leader" in obtaining and
making plumbing supply contracts. The trial court found that:
Thrifty [Gorlick's corporate name] did not pay the same prices as [his com-
petitors] for products of like kind and quality as those purchased at the same
time from Fowler Manufacturing Company. Because of the keenly com-
petitive market [in the State of Washington], prices at which the products were
purchased from the manufacturer significantly affected the re-sell price, the
business which could be done, the profits which could be expected. The
evidence establishes without a doubt, if not tacitly admitted by the defendants,
that Thrifty did not meet competition with [his competitors] and lost profits by
meeting such prices at least to the extent of the difference in the cost of the water heaters sold
by Thrifty and the cost of the water heaters sold by [his competitors].
85
Thus, the Fowler damage award is based on proof of actual lost profits and lost
customers. The court of appeals opinion affirmed this award. Consequently,
the presumption of damages in Fowler is mere dictum.
The Fowler concept of damages has a further inherent weakness. The Con-
gress, in fashioning the Robinson-Patman Act, explicitly considered and re-
jected the Fowler measure of damages. The Senate, in its version of the bill, in-
cluded a passage that read as follows:
For purposes of suit under Section 4 of the [Clayton] Act, the measure of
damages for any violation of this section shall, where the fact of damage is
shown, and in the absence of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the
83 Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 GEO. WAsH. L.
REv. 181, 210 (1961).
84 See Grace v. E.,J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 174(7th Cir. 1976); Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme
United Corp., 467 F.Supp. 350, 357 (E.D. Wis. 1979) ("[Ilt appears that if the buyer is unable to pass on
the price to its own customer, the price differential is a proper measure of damages."); Mississippi
Petroleum, Inc. v. Vermont Gas Systems, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,813 at 91,537 (S.D. Miss.
1972) ("[P]laintiff's claim of the price differential as his measure of damages is tenable.").
85 Brief for Appellee [Gorlick] at 8, quoting from Memorandum Decision ofJune 30, 1967 (emphasis
added). Quoted in Note, PrivateRecovay Under the Robnson-Patman Act, 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 941, 949 (1970).
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pecuniary amount or equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, payment or
grant involved in such violation .... 16
This provision was never part of the House bill and was deleted in conference.
The general rule of damages, which requires proof of loss, was considered ap-
propriate. Thus, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act directly
refutes the Fowler analysis.
The presumption implicit in Fowler, that a disfavored purchaser should be
automatically awarded damages for the full amount of the price discrimination,
does not comport with established case law. Numerous cases reject this asser-
tion. The leading case is Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co. 87 The court, per
Judge Learned Hand, held as follows:
At all events the statute should not be read as creating any presumption that "where
the fact of damage is shown * * * the pecuniary amount or equivalent of the
prohibited discrimination" is the "proper measure of damages." Exactly that
was a provision in the bill, when it came from the Senate to the House (S.
3154, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.), and it was eliminated in conference. This action
becomes particularly persuasive in contrast with the retention of that part of S
13(b) that imposes a burden of proof on the seller as to the effect of a
"discrimination." Congress obviously did not wish the seller to be under a
double burden, as soon as the buyer proved that he had been charged a higher
price than any of his competitors; especially the burden of proving the
negative upon an issue as to which the seller could know nothing and the
buyer everything. Indeed, that was a burden that Congress might well hesitate
to impose in an action in-which the seller must not only make good the buyer's
loss, but also pay him a fine in double the amount of his loss. It is fair to sup-
pose that, if Congress had thought the evil of price discrimination so great as
to require so drastic a procedural support, it would have made its purpose
more clear.
88
A number of cases have explicitly stated that there is no presumption of
damages. In Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Service, Inc.8 9 it was stated that "[t]he
court rejects any notion that damages may be presumed merely from the fact of
discrimination." Similarly, in Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co.90 the
court held "there is no presumption that the proscribed discrimination in price
has caused damage to the plaintiff. The burden of proving such damage is
always on the plaintiff.' '9 1 In Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co.92 the
plaintiff asserted that upon a showing of an illegal discrimination by defendant,
the plaintiff is immediately damaged as a matter of law to the extent of the
discrimination. The court firmly rejected the plaintiffs contention: "Plaintiffs
had no automatic right to recover the terminal charges without proof of loss,
86 S. 3154, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
87 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
88 Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
89 461 F.Supp. 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90 187 F.Supp. 345 (E.D. N.Y. 1960).
91 Id. at 353. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F.Supp. 404, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
aff'd in part and ret'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 No. 79-427
(February 19, 1980) (The court refused to instruct the jury that the amount of the price difference should
without more be taken as the measure of damages.)
92 197 F.Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
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even if a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act had been found to have
existed. " 93 In Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 9 the court "reject[ed] the sugges-
tion by plaintiff that his damages will be the amount of the price difference."
9 5
Several other cases have simply rejected a Fowler presumption by forcing
the plaintiff to prove its amount of losses. Even those cases which eventually ac-
cede to the "general damage" yardstick of Fowler-which award the plaintiff
the amount of the price differential-require proof that this is the amount of
loss that plaintiff has suffered.
The generally accepted measure of damages caused by price discrimina-
tion is the actual business losses which have been suffered by plaintiff.96 As
stated by Professor Rowe, "actual injury is a prerequisite to any recovery by a
'disfavored' customer-and that the amount of the discrimination may be the
ceiling on his recovery. "9
Virtually all of the cases which have agreed that the general damages rule
of Fowler should be applied have recognized the principle enunciated by Rowe.
Actual damages which the plaintiff has proven have been the standard for
recovery of damages. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. 9' is often cited
along with Fowler for the proposition that the award of general damages is prop-
er. Indeed, the opinion was written by Judge Johnsen, who also authored
Fowler. The case involved a violation of sections 2(d) and 2(e) in that the defen-
dant, a manufacturer of cosmetics, had paid the salary of a cosmetic clerk for
one store but only half the salary of the clerk in another store. The plaintiff
claimed injury to the extent of the half salary. The court held damages to be
established as follows:
What the seller is thus both permitted and commanded to do, we can see no
sound reason under the language or policy of the statute for not compelling
him to do by an action for general damages, where such damages have been directly
suffered and are plainly measurable. Thus, in the present case, it is obvious, as the
trial court found, that appellee has sustained a direct loss in "the increased
cost of the operation of its cosmetic department," to the extent of the dif-
ference in the allowances, which were arbitrarily made and without any pro-
portionalized basis or standard. 99
The court further noted cases in which general damages were not appropriate.
The Elizabeth Arden case is the most renowned general damage case.
However, it permits the recovery of general damages only in those instances
where they are the actual damages that plaintiff has suffered. As the court
stated in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.:100
[I]t matters little what label is placed on the type of damage that is being
sought in each particular case, the important consideration being that the
93 Id. at 852.
94 425 F.Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
95 Id. at 20.
96 See, F. RowE, supra note 73, at 530 ("When the defendant's causal responsibility appears, the plain-
tiff's recovery is measured by his actual business losses.") (emphasis in original).
97 Id. at 531 (emphasis in original).
98 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
99 Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
100 202 F.Supp. 768 (N.D. Il. 1961).
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damages, whatever form they may take, are actual business losses resulting
from or attributable to a violation of any section of the anti-trust laws. 10 1
The State Wholesale court, therefore, awarded damages equal to the amount of
the discrimination when such damages had been proven to have been suffered.
Furthermore, the court noted that it was deciding a section 2(d) case. "[A]s
counsel for the plaintiffs so convincingly argue, to hold that it is necessary for
the plaintiffs to show a loss of business in order to establish the fact of damage
would be to require them to meet the 'adverse effect upon competition' re-
quirement of Section 2(a). This would result in that requirement being read in-
to Section 2(d)."' 10 2 The court recognized that section 2(a) of the statute ex-
plicitly requires an actual loss of business to be shown and acknowledged the
impropriety of applying the generalized methodology of Elizabeth Arden or State
Wholesale Grocers to the Fowler situation.
The cases which do permit general damages to be recovered are generally
explicit in finding that actual injury to the extent of the price discrimination has
been suffered. In American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., '0 3 the court explained
that the standard of damages was not necessarily the difference in the price of
cans charged the plaintiff and that charged other customers. The court noted
that "the actual damages which the plaintiff suffered might possibly have been
a sum that equalled such difference." 10 4 It then analyzed the proof submitted
in light of the rule granting the plaintiff some leeway in proving the amount of
damages once the fact of damages is established.
Similarly, in Centuy. Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., ' 05 the court ap-
proved the price differential standard as "a proper measure of damages."106 It
did so on the basis that in a bid situation, in which bidders are supplied by the
same manufacturer, a price differential will naturally result in an injury in the
amount of the differential. This holding was predicated, however, on the
peculiar nature of competitive bidding by those with the same supplier. 0 7 In a
section 2(c) case, Grace v. E. J. Kozin Co., 10 8 the court awarded damages in the
amount of the illegal commission (bribe) that the defendant had granted to the
plaintiff's agent. 0 9 The court held that the amount of the bribe represented the
101 Id. at 773.
102 Id. at 776.
103 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1931).
104 Id. at 769.
105 467 F.Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
106 Id. at 357.
107 Id. ("I believe that in a case in which competing purchasers seek to resell the commodity in question
through a bid-award procedure, the winner being the lowest bidder, it is probable that there is little or no
opportunity for the winning bidder to pass on the higher price. An attempt to pass on the higher price
necessarily raises the bid and increases the chance that a competitor's bid will be lower. Accordingly, I
believe that the price differential is an appropriate measure of damages in this case. In the years 1974-1976,
the plaintiff purchased $6,732.54 worth of school scissors for which it should have received the 5% discount.
The price differential on these purchases, therefore, is $336.63.")
108 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976).
109 Id. at 174. ("The district court decided to award minimum damages to plaintiff under Count I. The
court quite sensibly assumed that if Kane had given his total undivided loyalty to Greene, Kane would have
negotiated for Kozin's lowest price, which would not have included any commission from Kozin to Kane. In
other words, had Greene and Kozin been the joint venturers, Kozin would have agreed to a price equal to
his proven price less the commission paid Kane, still allowing Kozin to realize his normal profit yet
eliminating in part the price discrimination. On this basis it was appropriate for the district court to con-
clude that plaintiff's damages under Count I were at least equal to the $19,780.64 commissions paid to Kane
on Kozin's sales to Greene.").
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minimum amount that plaintiff was injured. Such a rule is proper given that
there would be no payment made unless a return on the investment of at least
that amount was contemplated. Yet this has no relation to the dynamics in a
price discrimination case. In such a case, the manufacturer is supplying both
the favored and unfavored purchaser. From the manufacturer's perspective,
the fact of injury to plaintiff is entirely fortuitous. The manufacturer is con-
cerned solely with maximizing its sales. Indeed, presumably, it would prefer
plaintiff, the non-favored purchaser, to increase its sales since it pays the
manufacturer the greater price.
This survey indicates that some courts, upon analysis of the damages sus-
tained by plaintiff, have held that the amount of the discrimination has been an
appropriate standard of damages. However, these holdings have depended
upon a showing of injury in fact in the situation presented.
Numerous other cases have suggested how rarely the Fowler measure of
damages can properly be invoked. The seminal point of analysis for this rejec-
tion of the Fowler methodology is supplied by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Interstate
Commerce Commission v. United States."10 The case is not a Robinson-Patman
case, but the analysis is applicable:
If by reason of the discrimination, the preferred producers have been able to
divert business that would otherwise have gone to the disfavored shipper,
damage has resulted to the extent of the diverted profits. If the effect of the
discrimination has been to force the shipper to sell at a lowered ... price...
damage has resulted to the extent of the reduction. But none of these conse-
quences is a necessary inference from discrimination without more."'
The reasoning of Justice Cardozo was applied by Judge Learned Hand in
Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co. 1 12 In that case, plaintiff was denied damages.
The court's equation for measuring plaintiffs loss is instructive:
The gross loss was the profit on any sales that it would have made to the nine
competitors' customers whom it could and would, have retained, had it been
able to buy from the defendant at the same price as the competitors. From this
must, however, be deducted what added profit it may have got by being free to
charge what it chose, particularly in the through traffic where there was little
competition. Moreover, we have no reliable figures from which to appraise
either the gross loss or the gain, for the plaintiff had not shown how much of
the business of the nine Texaco competitors it would have retained or obtained
at the same price as they; and equally We do not know what would have been
It should also be noted that a proper damages rule was seemingly framed in Martin B. Glauser Dodge
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418 F.Supp. 1009 (D.N.J. 1976), reversed, 570 F.2d 72, 85 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978), as follows: fIf a direct correlation can be shown between an antitrust defen-
dant's discriminatory conduct and the profits lost by the plaintiff, the amount of discrimination is an accept-
able measure of damages. 418 F.Supp. at 1021. But see Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87
F.Supp. 985 (D. Fla. 1949), affirmed, 187 F.2d 919, modijzed on other grounds, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951) ("The price differential was clearly available to the larger competitor for in-
numerable competitive, and therefore harmful, purposes and of necessity the small canner, who has paid
more, has thereby sustained direct injury. Argument to the contrary is but to say that a lower price has not
been beneficial.") 87 F.Supp. at 990.
110 289 U.S. 385 (1933).
111 Id. at 390-91.
112 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
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its profit on the south bound through traffic if it has sold at the prevailing
prices.11s
It should be noted, however, that the court admitted that "the amount of the
discrimination might well be a proper measure of the buyer's damages" if the
buyer were forced to absorb the additional discriminatory price. In doing so,
however, it was clear that the plaintiff must show how the addition in price af-
fected the gallonage it sold.114
The Second Circuit, in Sun Cosmetics Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., t15 held that "[t]he only proper proof of damages is the loss to the plain-
tiff's business .... 1116 As a result, plaintiff was denied damages in precisely
the same context in which Judge Johnsen, for the Eighth Circuit, had awarded
them.1 1 7 It was in this setting that the Eighth Circuit decided American Can Co.
v. Russellville Canning Co. I " In that case, the court explicitly required a showing
of causal connection between injury and damages. 1 1 9 But the court went much
further. In denying plaintiff damages in that case, the court ruled:
We are of the opinion that there was an inadequate evidentiary basis for
awarding the plaintiff damages for the alleged impairment of its competitive
position. The district court apparently concluded that the failure of the plain-
tiff to maintain earnings during the postwar economic conditions upon the
same level as previously, could fairly be attributed to discriminatory practices
of the defendant. This upon the theory that all other causes had been
eliminated and that it was reasonable to infer that the plaintiff had suffered a
sort of financial attrition due solely to the practices of which complaint is
made. This conclusion we regard as too speculative and conjectural to sustain
any award of damages. There is no showing that the plaintiff ever ran out of
funds. Its earnings prior to 1946 were large and in that year its profits yielded
a high percentage of return upon its invested capital.
1 20
The Fowler general damage rule was also rejected in Kidd v. Esso Standard
Oil Co., 1 21 a service station operator's suit against an oil company for allegedly
selling gasoline to him at a higher price than it charged two of his competitors.
No evidence that the competitors lowered their prices or that the plaintiff lost
customers or profits was adduced at trial. The trial court charged the jury that
the service station operator could recover only actual damages, and the jury
found that no direct and proximate damages had been suffered as a result of the
violation. The plaintiff contended that damages should have been awarded for
at least the price differential. In affirming the jury decision, the court of appeals
113 Id. at 458-59.
114 Id. at 459.
115 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
116 Id. at 153.
117 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776
(1945).
118 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
119 Id. at 54.
120 Id. at 60. Recall, again that JudgeJohnsen, the author of both Fowler and Elizabeth Arden, dissented in
part in the Russellville case. He did so on the basis of his decision in Elizabeth Arden and the dictum in Bruce's
Juices which he was to rely upon in Fowler. The rest of the court, however, did not go along with him. Thus,
the Eighth Circuit had already cast suspicion uponJudgeJohnsen's Robinson-Patman analysis prior to his
authoring Fowler.
121 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961).
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held that the trial court's charge was a clear and correct statement of pertinent
legal principles. There was no recovery of damages.
There are numerous other cases which require that this stringent measure
of damages be employed. In Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 122 the court conclud-
ed that in order to recover damages "one must show lost profits resulting from
the necessity of meeting the prices of favored competitors or lost sales to such
favored competitors due to one's inability to meet their prices, or both.
'123
Similarly, in Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 124 the court required that the
plaintiffs actually demonstrate the amount of lost profits they were claiming.1 25
In Alexander v. Texas Co., 126 the court refused to allow the amount of the
discrimination to be used as the measure of damages and would allow recovery
only for actual lost profits on sales lost by the plaintiff to the favored
customers.
127
In Uniroyal Inc. v. Jetco Auto Service, Inc., 128 Uniroyal had granted a
wholesale distributor's allowance to its favored purchaser without insuring that
a certain percentage of these tires were sold wholesale. Furthermore, it granted
the allowance on all such tires rather than solely on the portions sold wholesale.
Jetco did not receive this allowance. In denying damages to the plaintiff, the
court held that "Jetco cannot complain if [the favored ptirchaser] generated
greater profit by reason of its lower costs so long as Jetco did not lose profits it
otherwise would have made.' '129 Guyott Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 130 is similarly em-
phatic in requiring "actual injury." ' 131 In determining actual injury "[t]he
critical question is what sales did Guyott lose as a result of the price it paid to
Texaco, not what accounts Guyott retained or obtained during the relevant
period." 132 In Dantzler v. Dictograph Products, Inc.,' 33 the court stated that
"plaintiff's recovery in the instant case is measured by the losses he suffered
from the discriminatory acts and not by the gains of the favored
competitor.' 1 34 In American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 135 the
court again demonstrated how the damage award must be tailored to the facts
demonstrating plaintiff's loss. In that case "[t]he District Court based its judg-
ment upon the evidence of a certified public accountant, who tabulated each of
122 166 F.Supp. 146 (D. Ore. 1958).
123 Id. at 147. Recall that this is the case which Fowler explicitly questioned but which was seemingly
reinstated by the subsequent Ninth Circuit case of Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668,
677 (9th Cir. 1975).
124 425 F.Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
125 Id. at 20 ("[T]he liability of the defendants for price discrimination would not be established unless
Kelly and his fellow class members could individually demonstrate that the higher prices they paid for
original equipment replacement parts caused them to lose profits to competing new car dealers.").
126 149 F.Supp. 37 (W.D. La. 1957).
127 Id. at 41 ("Rather, the true yardstick of [plaintiff's] damages, if any, in this respect would be the
gross loss of profit on sales he otherwise would have made to those customers who bought from the favored
dealers, instead of from plaintiff, because of the price differential.").
128 461 F.Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
129 Id. at 359. Other cases which involve similar fact patterns which deny plaintiff any damage are
Krieger v. Texaco, 373 F.Supp. 108, 112-13 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) and McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F.Supp.
1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
130 261 F.Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1966).
131 Id. at 952.
132 Id. at 953.
133 309 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963).
134 Id. at 330.
135 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
[Vol. 55:660]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
plaintiff's sales made in Illinois at 65e. . . . He also calculated the amount of
each item if it had been sold at 754 .... The difference between these totals is
the amount upon which the judgment is based.' 1 36 The court meticulously
awarded such damages only in those areas where it was absolutely certain that
plaintiff lost profits due to defendant's activities. The Fifth Circuit has recently
re-emphasized this in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc.:137 "Payne
relied on its calculation of the alleged price discrimination to establish the
amount of its alleged lost sales and profits. There is no necessary correlation,
however, and Payne failed to establish one." ' 138 Simply put, establishing the
amount of lost sales or profits is a requirement to recovery in these cases.13 9
The commentators, too, have virtually universally disagreed with the
Fowler analysis. Professor Rowe, of course, had always argued that plaintiff's
recovery must be "measured by his actual business losses." 40 This contention
embodies the general thrust of the commentary subsequent to Fowler and con-
stitutes the basis upon which Fowler is most sharply criticized.
As stated in one particularly critical article:
The general damage rule [the Fowler rule] has been explicitly refused endorse-
ment by Congress, spurned in practice by the courts, and appears inconsistent
with the effective preservation of free and open competition. In the context of
treble damage actions under the Robinson-Patman Act, the time, but not the
opportunity, has long since passed for full adoption of the specific damage rule
and the subsequent termination of the prevailing confusion in the courts.
141
Other commentators have agreed. For example, one author noted that the
holding of Fowler v. Gorlick is "unnecessary and will only treat plaintiffs to un-
equalizing windfalls that are inconsistent with the purpose of the Act." 14 2 The
136 Id. at 914.
137 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).
138 Id. at 1137. The court also noted that "[a] price difference without more does not indicate the
amount of lost sales or profits." Id. See EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, 478 F.Supp. 243 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), which offers an excellent summary of the law and analysis in the area and concludes that plaintiff
failed to present enough damages evidence to submit the issue of liability to the jury. 478 F.Supp. at 276.
The fact that the court mistakenly claims "that Fowler was decided more than ten years before Enterprise"
478 F.Supp. at 275 n.69, thus, implying Fowler to be outdated by the plethora of adverse case law does not
seriously detract from the strength of the opinion. The conclusion that Fowler is an anachronism remains
valid.
139 The holdings in primary-line injury cases have been similar and buttress the line of cases which have
been cited. For example, in Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block and Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960), the court emphatically required a showing of actual in-
juries and held as follows:
The statute speaks of injury to "business or property" . . . And, those words in their ordinary
sense have been construed in terms of (1) the difference, if any, between the amounts actually
realized by the injured party and what it would have reasonably expected to realize from sales but
for the unlawful acts complained of; and (2) the extent to which the value of the petitioner's prop-
erty had been diminished as a result of such acts....
269 F.2d at 958-59.
In John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum, 588 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979), the court stated that "[e]very Robinson-Patman plaintiff must prove that the defendant's price
discrimination has caused damage to him, Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648, 89 S.Ct. 1871,
23 L.Ed. 2d 599 (1969), and the most common form of damage to a plaintiff competing seller would likely be lost
profits because of a loss of customers. " 588 F.2d at 29 (emphasis added). There can be no doubt that the case law
is heavily weighted against the Fowler damage analysis.
140 F. RowE, supra note 73, at 530 (emphasis in original).
141 Note, Private Recovery Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Confusion in the Courts on the Proper Measure of
Damages, 21 SYRAcusa L.REv. 941, 953 (1970).
142 Casenote, Antitrust Laws-Damages, 48 TEx. L. Rav. 690, 695 (1970).
[June 19801
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
same analysis is evidenced by an author who states that the Fowler analysis
"seems to violate the congressional intent and the language of the private en-
forcement section of the Clayton Act.'
1 43
The moat telling criticism of Fowler is provided by Professor Handler who
expressed disagreement with the Fowler automatic damage rule for reasons of
logic and policy. 144 The logical deficiencies of Fowler involve the issue of prov-
ing harm to the plaintiff:
[I]n Robinson-Patman terms, the sina qua non of any recovery in a secondary
line price discrimination case is a decision by the favored purchaser to take ad-
vantage of his lower cost by reducing his resale price. Then, and only then,
can the seller's grant of an unlawful lower price to the favored buyer possibly
result in injury to the plaintiff. That injury can be established in one of two
ways. Once the favored buyer has lowered his price, the plaintiff has two op-
tions: (1) he may drop his price to avoid lost sales, in which event his damage
would be the loss of profit margin due to the lower resale price; or (2) he may
choose to maintain his higher resale price and suffer injury measured by the
loss of profit on sales diverted to the favored competitor.1
45
As to the policy deficiencies in the Fowler reasoning, Handler points to the in-
herent anticompetitive nature of the Robinson-Patman Act. "So long as en-
forcement of the Robinson-Patman Act has been limited to cease and desist
orders and to occasional damage recoveries by those able to show actual
pecuniary injury, the statute's anticompetitive bias has been ameliorated."
1 46
Yet a rule of automatic damages may well raise a spectre of massive treble-
damage exposure every time a seller lowers his price. This threat may impede
natural market forces and thwart competition. Thus, as a matter of policy,
Fowler is incorrect.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff, in a private treble-damage
action is permitted to recover only for its antitrust injury. This is defined as the
harm flowing "from that which made the defendant's acts unlawful."1 47 Pro-
fessor Handler has analyzed the application of this doctrine to a section 2(a)
claim as follows:
In a secondary-line price discrimination case, it is not the price differential
itself which makes defendant's conduct unlawful, just as it is not the merger
itself which violates section 7; rather, the illegality results (if at all) from the
statute's proscribed "anticompetitive effects"-the likelihood that the alleged
discrimination may substantially lessen competition. The crux of the illegality
is the injury which stems from that likely lessening of competition-in other
words, that the price discrimination may enable the favored purchaser to
lower his resale price to the competitive disadvantage of the disfavored plain-
tiff.
143 Casenote, Antitrust-Robinson-Patman Act, 23 VAND. L. REV. 400, 403, (1970). See Recent Decisions,
Restraint of Trade, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 295 (1970).
144 Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1971) ("Even if we were to ignore the plain logical deficiencies in
an automative damage rule, and turn solely to policy considerations, I have grave doubts with respect to the
Fowler result.")
145 Id. at 33-34.
146 Id. at 35.
147 Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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Brunswick thus serves to reaffirm Enterprise's basic teaching: that cognizable in-
jury in a section 2(a) case is to be traced not to the higher price paid by the
plaintiff (the overcharge)-since the infraction is a price difference and all the
law requires of the seller is a parity in pricing-but rather to the undercharge to
plaintiffs competitor. Justice Cardozo, with characteristic felicity, put it this
way in a different, but related, context: "The question is not how much better
off the complainant would be today if it had paid a lower rate. The question is
how much worse off it is because others have paid less." Put in Brunswick's
terms, the fact that the disfavored purchaser pays more for the same product
than the favored purchaser, while constituting a form of economic injury or
harm to plaintiff's pocketbook, does not amount to "antitrust injury" or pro-
vide a proper measure of antitrust damages. On the other hand, "antitrust in-
jury" is sustained where it can be shown that the favored competitor, by vir-
tue of his lower cost, lowered his resale price so that the plaintiff either lost
sales volume (if he did not meet his competition) or lost profits (if he did match
the lower resale price). It is the harm from discrimination, that is the under-
charge and not from the overcharge, which constitutes antitrust injury in the
Brunswick sense. 1
48
Professor Handler's analysis seems to have succinctly summarized the law
as it has developed since Enterprise. Indeed, it was found dispositive in the re-
cent case of EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc. 149
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit decision in Fowler v. Gorlick potentially affects two
elements of a plaintiffs case. The first element is that of causation. Fowler ap-
pears to hold that the plaintiff needs only to prove a price differential and that
no proof of connection between the prohibited price discrimination and the in-
jury alleged needs to be proven.
There does not appear to be any justification for such a presumption of
causation. The Supreme Court has expressly disaffirmed such a presumption
in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.'50 Furthermore, both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court have been adamant in their requirement that proof of causa-
tion be established in all antitrust suits. In failing to consider section 4 of the
Clayton Act, the Fowler court disregarded the statutory history of the
Robinson-Patman Act which requires a showing of a causal connection be-
tween the antitrust violation alleged and the injuries asserted. Without such a
showing, plaintiff cannot prevail.
The second element of a private action for a price discrimination case
which Fowler influences is the amount of damages to which the plaintiff may be
entitled and the method of computation by which this amount is ascertained.
In fact, Fowler may affect the computation of damages in two ways. First, it ap-
pears to establish a presumption of damages to be awarded in the amount of
the price discrimination. Secondly, it establishes that the measure of damages
148 Handier, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term- 1977, 77 CoLUM.
L. REv. 979, 992-93 (1977).
149 478 F.Supp. 243, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
150 395 U.S. 642, (1969).
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to be awarded the plaintiff in most price discrimination cases is to be the
amount of the discrimination.
There are several reasons why those damages assertions in Fowler seem an
incorrect statement of the recognized and applied rules of law. In the first
place, in Fowler itself the plaintiff received damages for its actual proven in-
juries. Thus, the Fowler damages language is mere dictum. Furthermore, the
Fowler damages analysis was considered and rejected by the United States Con-
gress in fashioning the Robinson-Patman Act. Instead, the specific measure-
ment of damages prescribed by section 4 of the Clayton Act was deemed ap-
propriate. Under that standard, an actual showing of damages is required for
recovery and no presumption operates thereunder.
The claim of a presumption regarding damages has been rejected by
numerous cases. The leading case is Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.' 5 1 The
number of cases rejecting such a presumption is overwhelming. Indeed, even
the Ninth Circuit, in a case subsequent to Fowler, has held that the plaintiff
must prove that "the discrimination caused injury to the plaintiff." 152 This ob-
viously rebuts any holding establishing a presumption of damages.
The Fowler analysis regarding the measure of damages which may be ap-
propriate in certain cases is slightly more persuasive. Nevertheless, the plain-
tiff's recovery must be measured by its actual business losses. It may be true
that the Fowler measure is appropriate in some cases, but this is only when the
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff are the same as the amount of the price
discrimination. Thus, it is only to the extent that a plaintiff has actually lost
sales or lost profits that damages may be recovered. Obviously, it is the rare
case in which the price differential marks these criteria.
While Fowler may have some limited impact in the analysis of the ap-
propriate measure of damages, its presumptions regarding causation and
amount of damages have been thoroughly discredited. These presumptions
probably never were the rule of law and should not be followed today.
The stutement by the court in EdwardJ Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc. 153 seems absolutely correct. "After reviewing Fowler and cases decided
before and after it, I find that it does not represent the law of this circuit and
probably would not represent the law of the Ninth Circuit today."15
4
151 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965, (1957) (perJudge Learned Hand).
152 511 F.2d 668, 677 (9th Cir. 1975).
153 478 F.Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
154 Id. at 273.
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